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Abstract. Commodity OS kernels have broad attack surfaces due to
the large code base and the numerous features such as device drivers.
For a real-world use case (e.g., an Apache Server), many kernel services
are unused and only a small amount of kernel code is used. Within the
used code, a certain part is invoked only at runtime while the rest are
executed at startup and/or shutdown phases in the kernel’s lifetime run.
In this paper, we propose a reliable and practical system, named KASR,
which transparently reduces attack surfaces of commodity OS kernels at
runtime without requiring their source code. The KASR system, residing
in a trusted hypervisor, achieves the attack surface reduction through a
two-step approach: (1) reliably depriving unused code of executable per-
missions, and (2) transparently segmenting used code and selectively
activating them. We implement a prototype of KASR on Xen-4.8.2 hy-
pervisor and evaluate its security effectiveness on Linux kernel-4.4.0-
87-generic. Our evaluation shows that KASR reduces the kernel attack
surface by 64% and trims off 40% of CVE vulnerabilities. Besides, KASR
successfully detects and blocks all 6 real-world kernel rootkits. We mea-
sure its performance overhead with three benchmark tools (i.e., SPECINT,
httperf and bonnie++). The experimental results indicate that KASR
imposes less than 1% performance overhead (compared to an unmodified
Xen hypervisor) on all the benchmarks.
Keywords: Kernel Attack Surface Reduction, Reliable and Practical System,
Hardware-Assisted Virtualization
1 Introduction
In order to satisfy various requirements from individuals to industries, commod-
ity OS kernels have to support numerous features, including various file systems
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and numerous peripheral device drivers. These features inevitably result in a
broad attack surface, and this attack surface becomes broader and broader with
more services consolidated into the kernel every year. As a consequence, the cur-
rent kernel attack surface gives an adversary numerous chances to compromise
the OS kernel and exploit the whole system. Although we have moved into the
virtualization and cloud era, the security threats are not being addressed. In-
stead it becomes even worse with the introduction of additional software stacks,
e.g., a hypervisor layer. Recent years have witnessed many proposed approaches
which realized the severity of this issue and made an effort to reduce the at-
tack surface of the virtualized system. Specifically, schemes like NoHype [32],
XOAR [7] HyperLock [35] and Min-V [24] are able to significantly reduce the
attack surface of the hypervisor. In addition, several other schemes have been
proposed to reduce the huge kernel attack surface, which are summarized into
the following three categories.
Build from Scratch. The first category attempts to build a micro-kernel
with a minimal attack surface [1,12,11,14], among which Sel4 [14] is the first OS
that achieves a high degree of assurance through formal verification. Although
such micro-kernel schemes retrofit security, they are incompatible with legacy
applications.
Re-Construction. The second category makes changes to current mono-
lithic kernel. Nooks [31], and LXFI [21] isolate buggy device drivers to reduce
the attack surface of the kernel. Considering that the reduced kernel is still large,
Nested Kernel [9] places a small isolated kernel inside the monolithic kernel, fur-
ther reducing the attack surface. Besides, strict access-control policies [8,28] and
system call restrictions [26] also contribute a lot. A common limitation of these
approaches is that they all require modifications of the kernel source code, which
is usually not applicable.
Customization. The last category manages to tailor existing kernels with-
out modifications. Tartler [33], Kernel Tailoring [18] and Lock-in-Pop [19] require
the Linux source code of either the kernel or core libraries (i.e., glibc) to restrict
user’s access to the kernel. They lack the OS distribution support due to the
requirement of source code re-compiling. Ktrim [17] and KRAZOR [16] rely on
specific kernel features (i.e., kprobes) to binary-instrument kernel functions and
remove unused ones. Face-Change [10] is a hypervisor-based technique to tailor
the kernel code. It supports neither the Kernel Address Space Layout Random-
ization (KASLR) [8] nor multiple-vCPU for the target kernel. Besides, it induces
a worst-case overhead of 40%, impeding its deployment in practice.
Overview. In this paper, we propose a reliable and practical virtualized
system, named KASR, which is able to transparently reduce the attack surface
of a commodity OS kernel at runtime.
Consider a specified application workload (e.g., an Apache server), whose
operations do not necessarily need all kernel services. Instead, only a subset
of the services are invoked to support both the target Apache process and the
kernel. For example, both of them always require code blocks related to mem-
ory management (e.g., kmalloc, kfree, get page) and synchronization mechanisms
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(e.g., spin lock). Apart from that, certain used kernel functions are only used
during a specific period of kernel’s lifetime and remain unused for the rest of
the time. For instance, the initialization (e.g., kernel init) and power-off actions
(e.g., kernel power off ) will only be taken when the kernel starts up and shuts
down, respectively. In contrast to these used kernel code, many other kernel ser-
vices are never executed. We call them unused kernel code in this paper. The
unused kernel code resides in the main memory, contributing to a large portion
of the kernel attack surface. For example, a typical kernel vulnerability, e.g.,
CVE-2013-2094, is exploited via a crafted system call perf event open that is
unused or never invoked in the Apache workload.
Motivated by the above observation, KASR achieves the kernel attack surface
reduction in two steps. The first step is to reliably deprive unused code of ex-
ecutable permissions. Commodity OS kernels are designed and implemented to
support all kinds of use cases (e.g., the Apache server and Network File System
service), and therefore there will be a large portion of kernel code (e.g., system
call handlers) unused for a given use case. By doing so, this step could effectively
reduce a large portion of the attack surface. The second step transparently seg-
ments used code and selectively activates it according to the specific execution
demands of the given use case. This segmentation is inspired by the observation
that certain kernel code blocks (e.g., kernel init) only execute in a particular
period, and never execute beyond that period. As a result, KASR dramatically
reduces the attack surface of a running OS kernel.
We implement a KASR prototype on a private cloud platform, with Xen 4.8.2
as the hypervisor and Ubuntu Server 16.04.3 LTS as the commodity OS. The
OS kernel is unmodified Linux version 4.4.0-87-generic with KASLR [8] enabled.
KASR only adds about 1.2K SLoC to the hypervisor code base. We evaluate
its security effectiveness under the given use cases (e.g., Linux, Apache, MySQL
and PHP (LAMP)-based server). The experimental results indicate that KASR
reduces more than 64% kernel attack surface at the granularity of code pages.
Also, we trims off 40% of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), since
the CVE reduction indicates the number of CVEs that KASR could avoid. In ad-
dition, KASR successfully detects and blocks all 6 real-world kernel rootkits. We
also measure the performance overhead using several popular benchmark tools as
given use cases, i.e., SPECint, httperf and bonnie++. The overall performance
overheads are 0.23%, 0.90% and 0.49% on average, respectively.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following key contributions:
– Propose a novel two-step approach to reliably and practically reduce the
kernel attack surface with being agnostic to the particular OS.
– Design and implement a practical KASR system on a recent private cloud
platform. KASR transparently “fingerprints” used kernel code and enables
them to execute according to their execution phases.
– Evaluate the security effectiveness of the KASR system by the reductions of
kernel attack surface, CVE and the mitigation of real-world rootkits.
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– Measure the performance overhead of the KASR system using several pop-
ular benchmark tools. The low overhead makes KASR reasonable for real-
world deployment.
Organization. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
briefly describe our system goals and a threat model. In Section 3, we present
the kernel attack surface, its measurement and the rationale of its reduction. We
introduce in detail the system architecture of KASR in Section 4. Section 5 and
Section 6 present the primary implementation of KASR and its performance
evaluation, respectively. In Section 7 and Section 8, we discuss limitations of
KASR, and compare it with existing works, respectively. At last, we conclude
this paper in Section 9.
2 Threat Model and Design Goals
Before we describe our design, we specify the threat model and the design goals.
2.1 Threat Model
In this paper, we focus on reducing the attack surfaces of commodity OS kernels
in a virtualized environment. Currently, most personal computers, mobile phones
and even embedded devices are armed with the virtualization techniques, such
as Intel [13], AMD [2] and ARM virtualization support [3]. Thus, our system
can work on such devices.
We assume a hypervisor or a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) working be-
neath the OS kernel. The hypervisor is trusted and secure as the root of trust.
Although there are vulnerabilities for some existing hypervisors, we can leverage
additional security services to enhance their integrity [34,6,4] and reduce their
attack surfaces [32,7]. As our system relies on a training-based approach, we
also assume the system is clean and trusted in the training stage, but it could
be compromised at any time after that.
We consider threats coming from both remote adversaries and local adver-
saries. A local adversary resides in user applications, such as browsers and email
clients. The kernel attack surface exposed to the local adversary includes system
calls, exported virtual file system (e.g., Linux proc file system) for user applica-
tions. A remote adversary stays outside and communicates with the OS kernel
via hardware interfaces, such as a NIC. The kernel attack surface for the remote
adversary usually refers to device drivers.
2.2 Design Goals
Our goal is to design a reliable, transparent and efficient system to reduce the
attack surfaces of commodity OS kernels.
G1: Reliable. The attack surface should be reliably and persistently reduced.
Even if kernel rootkits can compromise the OS kernel, they cannot enlarge the
reduced attack surface to facilitate subsequent attacks.
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G2: Transparent. The system should transparently work for the commodity
OS kernels. Particularly, it neither relies on the source code nor breaks the kernel
code integrity through binary instrumentation. Source code requirement is diffi-
cult to be adopt in practice. And breaking the code integrity raises compatibility
issues against security mechanisms, such as Integrity Measurement Architecture.
G3: Efficient. The system should minimize the performance overhead, e.g.,
the overall performance overhead on average is less than 1%.
Among these goals, G1 is for security guarantee, while the other two goals
(G2 and G3 ) are for making the system practical. Every existing approach
has one or more weaknesses: they either are unreliable (e.g., Lock-in-Pop [19]
as per G1), or depend on the source code (e.g., SeL4 [14]), or break the kernel
code integrity (e.g., Ktrim [17]), or incur high performance overhead (e.g., Face-
Change [10]). Our KASR system is able to achieve all the above goals at the
same time.
3 Design Rationale
We first present how to measure the attack surface of a commodity OS kernel,
and then illustrate how to reliably and practically reduce it.
3.1 Attack Surface Measurement
To measure the kernel attack surface, we need a security metric that reflects
the system security. Generally, the attack surface of a kernel is measured by
counting its source line of code (SLoC). This metric is simple and widely used.
However, this metric takes into account all the source code of a kernel, regardless
of whether it is effectively compiled into the kernel binary. To provide a more
accurate security measurement, Kurmus et al. [18] propose a fine-grained generic
metric, named GENSEC, which only counts effective source code compiled into
the kernel. More precisely, in the GENSEC metric, the kernel attack surface is
composed of the entire running kernel, including all the Loadable Kernel Modules
(LKMs).
However, the GENSEC metric only works with the kernel source code, rather
than the kernel binary. Thus it is not suitable for a commodity OS with only
a kernel binary that is made of a kernel image and numerous module binaries.
To fix this gap, we apply a new KASR security metric. Specifically, instead of
counting source lines of code, the KASR metric counts all executable instruc-
tions.
Similar to prior schemes that commonly use SLoC as the metric of the attack
surface, the KASR metric uses the Number of Instructions (NoI). It naturally
works well with instruction sets where all the instructions have an equal length
(e.g., ARM instructions). However, with a variable-length instruction set (e.g.,
x86 instructions [13]), it is hard to count instructions accurately. In order to
address this issue on such platforms, we use the Number of Instruction Pages
(NoIP). NoIP is reasonable and accurate due to the following reasons. First, it is
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consistent with the paging mechanism that is widely deployed by all commodity
OS kernels. Second, the kernel instructions are usually contiguous and organized
in a page-aligned way. Finally, it could smoothly address the issue introduced
by variable-length instructions without introducing any explicit security and
performance side-effects. In this paper, the KASR metric depends on NoIP to
measure the kernel attack surface.
3.2 Benefits of Hardware-assisted Virtualization
In a hardware-assisted virtualization environment, there are two levels of page
tables. The first-level page table, i.e., Guest Page Table (GPT), is managed by
the kernel in the guest space, and the other one, i.e., Extended Page Table (EPT),
is managed by the hypervisor in the hypervisor space. The hardware checks the
access permissions at both levels for a memory access. If the hypervisor removes
the executable permission for a page Pa in the EPT, then the page Pa can never
be executed, regardless of its access permissions in the GPT. These mechanisms
have been widely supported by hardware processors (e.g., Intel [13], AMD [2],
and ARM [3]) and commodity OSes.
With the help of the EPT, we propose to reduce the attack surface by trans-
parently removing the executable permissions of certain kernel code pages. This
approach achieves all system goals listed before. First, it is reliable (achieving
G1) since an adversary in the guest space does not have the capability of modify-
ing the EPT configurations. Second, the attack surface reduction is transparent
(achieving G2), as the page-table based reduction is enforced in the hypervisor
space, without requiring any modifications (e.g., instruction instrumentation) of
the kernel binary. Finally, it is efficient (achieving G3) as all instructions within
pages that have executable permissions are able to execute at a native speed.
4 KASR Design
Fig. 1: The architecture of the KASR system.
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We firstly elaborate the design of the KASR system. As depicted in Figure 1,
the general working flow of KASR proceeds in two stages: an offline training stage
followed by a runtime enforcement stage. In the offline training stage, a trusted
OS kernel Kern is running beneath a use case (e.g., user application Appa)
within a virtual machine. The KASR offline training processor residing in the
hypervisor space, monitors the kernel’s lifetime run, records its code usage and
generates a corresponding database. The generated kernel code usage database
is trusted, as the system in the offline training stage is clean. Once the generated
database becomes stable and ready to use, the offline training stage is done.
In the runtime enforcement stage, the KASR module, running the same vir-
tual machine, loads the generated database and reduces the attack surface of
Kern. The kernel attack surface is made up of the kernel code from the kernel
image as well as loaded LKMs. A large part of the kernel attack surface is re-
liably removed (the dotted square in Figure 1). Still, the remaining part (the
solid shaded-square in Figure 1) is able to support the running of the use case
Appa. The attack surface reduction is reliable, as the hypervisor can use the
virtualization techniques to protect itself and the KASR system, indicating that
no code from the virtual machine can revert the enforcement.
4.1 Offline Training Stage
Fig. 2: Offline Training Stage. The KASR offline training processor working
in the hypervisor space, extracts used code from the OS kernel, segments used
code into three phases (i.e., startup, runtime and shutdown) and generates the
kernel code usage database.
Commodity OSes are designed and implemented to support various use cases.
However, for a given use case (e.g., Appa), only certain code pages within the
kernel (e.g., Kern) are used while other code pages are unused. Thus, the KASR
offline training processor can safely extract the used code pages from the whole
kernel, the so-called used code extraction. On top of that, the used code pages
can be segmented into three phases (e.g., startup, runtime and shutdown). The
code segmentation technique is inspired by the observation that some used code
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pages are only used in a particular time period. For instance, the init functions
are only invoked when the kernel starts up and thus they should be in the
startup phase. However, for certain functions, e.g., kmalloc and kfree, they are
used during the kernel’s whole lifetime and owned by all three phases. The KASR
offline training processor uses the used code extraction technique (Section 4.1) to
extract the used code pages, and leverages the used code segmentation technique
(Section 4.1) to segment used code into different phases. All the recorded code
usage information will be saved into the kernel code usage database, as shown
in Figure 2.
The database will become stable quickly after the KASR offline processor
repeats the above steps several times. Actually, this observation has been suc-
cessfully confirmed by some other research works [18,17]. For instance, for the use
case of LAMP, a typical httperf [23] training of about ten minutes is sufficient
to detect all required features, although the httperf does not cover all possible
paths. This observation is reasonable due to the following two reasons. First,
people do not update the OS kernel frequently, and thus it will be stable within
a relatively long period. Second, although the user-level operations are complex
and diverse, the invoked kernel services (e.g., system calls) are relatively stable,
e.g., the kernel code that handles network packets and system files is constantly
the same.
Used Code Extraction A key requirement of this technique is to collect all
used pages for a given workload. It means that the collection should cover the
whole lifetime of an OS kernel, from the very beginning of the startup phase to
the last operation of the shutdown phase. A straightforward solution is to use the
trace service provided by the OS kernel. For instance, the Linux kernel provides
the ftrace feature to trace the kernel-level function usage. However, all existing
integrated tracing schemes cannot cover the whole life cycle. For example, ftrace
always misses the code usage of the startup phase [18] before it is enabled.
Extending the trace feature requires modifying the kernel source code. To avoid
the modification and cover the whole life cycle of the OS kernel, we propose a
hypervisor-based KASR offline training processor. The offline training processor,
working in the hypervisor space, starts to run before the kernel starts up and
remains operational after the kernel shuts down.
In the following, we will discuss how to trace and identify the used code pages
in the kernel image and loaded LKMs.
Kernel Image Tracing. Before the kernel starts to run, the offline training
processor removes the executable permissions of all code pages of the kernel
image. By doing so, every code execution within the kernel image will raise
an exception, driving the control flow to the offline training processor. In the
hypervisor space, the offline training processor maintains the database recording
the kernel code usage status. When getting an exception, the offline training
processor updates the corresponding record, indicating that a kernel code page is
used. To avoid this kernel code page triggering any unnecessary exceptions later,
the offline training processor sets it to executable. As a result, only the newly
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executed kernel code pages raise exceptions and the kernel continues running,
thus covering the lifetime used code pages of the kernel image. Note that the
offline training processor filters out the user-space code pages by checking where
the exception occurs. (i.e., the value of Instruction Pointer (IP) register).
Kernel Modules Tracing. The above tracing mechanism works smoothly
with the kernel image, but not with newly loaded LKMs. All LKMs can be
dynamically installed and uninstalled into/from memory at runtime, and the
newly installed kernel modules may re-use the executable pages that have already
been freed by other modules in order to load their code. Thus, their page contents
have totally changed and they become new code pages that ought to be traced as
well. If we follow the kernel tracing mechanism, such to-be-reused pages cannot
be recorded into the database. Because these pages have been traced and the
processor has set them to executable, they are unable to trigger any exceptions
even when they are reused by other modules.
To address this issue, we dictate that only the page currently causing the
exception can gain the executable permission while other pages cannot. Specif-
ically, when a page Pa raises an exception, the offline training processor sets it
to executable so that the kernel can proceed to next page Pb. Once Pb raises the
exception, it is set to executable while Pa is set back to non-executable. Like-
wise, the offline training processor sets Pb back to non-executable when another
exception occurs. By doing so, pages like Pa or Pb can trigger new exceptions if
they will be re-used by newly installed modules and thus all used code pages can
be traced. Obviously, this approach is also suitable for the kernel image tracing.
Page Identification. The traced information is saved in the database, and
the database reserves a unique identity for each code page. It is relatively easy
to identify all code pages of the kernel image when its address space layout
is unique and constant every time the kernel starts up. Thus, a Page Frame
Number (PFN) could be used as the identification. However, recent commodity
OS kernels have already enabled the KASLR technology [8] and thus the PFN of
a code page is no longer constant. Likewise, this issue also occurs with the kernel
modules, whose pages are dynamically allocated at runtime, and each time the
kernel may assign a different set of PFNs to the same kernel module.
A possible approach is to hash every page’s content as its own identity. It
works for most of the code pages but will fail for the code pages which have
instructions with dynamically determined opcodes, e.g., for the call instruction,
it needs an absolute address as its operand, and this address may be different
each time, causing the failure of page identification. Another alternative is to
apply the fuzzy hash algorithm (e.g., ssdeep [15]) over a page and compute
a similarity (expressed as a percentage) between two pages. e.g., if two pages
have a similarity of over 60%, they are identical. However, such low similarity
will introduce false positives, which can be exploited by attackers to prompt
malicious pages for valid ones in the runtime enforcement stage.
To address the issues, we propose a multi-hash-value approach. In this offline
training stage, we trace the kernel for multiple rounds (e.g., 10 rounds) to collect
all the used pages and dump the page content of each used page. Then we build a
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map of what bytes are constant and what bytes are dynamic in every used page.
Each used page has multiple ranges and each range is made up of consecutive
constant bytes. The ranges are separated by the dynamic bytes. Based on the
map, we compute a hash value for every range. If and only if two pages have the
same hash value for each range, they are identical. As a result, a page’s identity
is to hash everything within the page but the dynamic bytes. On top of that,
we observe that the maximum byte-length of the consecutive dynamic bytes is
4, making it hardly possible for attackers to replace the dynamic bytes with
meaningful rogue ones. Relying on the approach, the risk of abusing the false
positives is minimized.
Used Code Segmentation This technique is used to segment the used code
into several appropriate phases. By default, there are three phases: startup, run-
time, and shutdown, indicating which phases the used code have been executed
in. When the kernel is executing within one particular phase out of the three, the
offline training processor marks corresponding code pages with that phase. After
the kernel finishes its execution, the offline training processor successfully marks
all used code pages and saves their records into the database. To be aware of the
phase switch, the offline training processor captures the phase switch events. For
the switch between startup and runtime, we use the event when the first user
application starts to run, while for the switch between runtime and shutdown,
we choose the execution of the reboot system call as the switch event.
4.2 Runtime Enforcement Stage
Fig. 3: Runtime Enforcement Stage. The KASR module residing in the hy-
pervisor space reduces OS kernel attack surface in two consecutive steps. The
first step (i.e., permission deprivation) reliably deprives unused code of exe-
cutable permission, and the second step (i.e., lifetime segmentation) selectively
activates corresponding used code according to their phases.
When the offline training stage is done and a stable database has been gen-
erated (see details in Section 5.2), KASR is ready for runtime enforcement. As
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shown in Figure 3, the KASR module loads the generated database for a specific
workload, and reduces the kernel attack surface in two steps:
1. Permission Deprivation. It keeps the executable permissions of all used code
pages (the solid shaded square in Figure 3), and reliably removes the exe-
cutable permissions of all unused code pages (the dotted square in Figure 3)
2. Lifetime Segmentation. It aims to further reduce the kernel attack surface
upon the permission deprivation. As shown in Figure 3, it transparently
allows the used kernel code pages of a particular phase to execute while
setting the remaining pages to non-executable.
All instructions within the executable pages can execute at a native speed, with-
out any interventions from the KASR module. When the execution enters the
next phase, the KASR module needs to revoke the executable permissions from
the pages of the current phase, and set executable permissions to the pages
of the next phase. To reduce the switch cost, the KASR module performs two
optimizations. First, if a page is executable within the successive phase, the
KASR module skips its permission-revocation and keeps it executable. Second,
the KASR module updates the page permissions in batch, rather than updating
them individually.
5 KASR Database
This section presents the implementation details of the KASR database, includ-
ing database data-structure, database operations.
5.1 Data Structure
Basically, the database consists of two single-linked lists, which are used to man-
age the pages of kernel image and loaded modules, respectively. Both lists have
their own list lock to support concurrent updates. Every node of each list rep-
resenting a page is composed of a node lock, a page ID, a status flag and a
node pointer pointing to its next node. The node lock is required to avoid race
conditions and thus other nodes can be processed in parallel.
Page ID. The page ID is used to identify a page especially during the database
updates. As kernel-level randomization is enabled within the kernel, we use the
multi-hash-value approach for the identification. Specifically, we trace the kernel
for 10 rounds to make sure that all the used pages are collected. Pages in different
rounds are considered to be identical (i.e., a same page) if they satisfy two
properties: (1) more than 3366 out of 4096 bytes (i.e., over 82%) are constant and
the same among these pages; (2) the maximum byte-length of the consecutive
different bytes (i.e., dynamic bytes) among these pages is no greater than 4. And
then we perform a per-byte comparison of the identical pages so as to build a
map of what bytes are constant and what bytes are dynamic with the pages. By
doing so, each used page has multiple ranges of consecutive constant bytes and
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dynamic bytes are between these ranges. As a result, all the constant bytes of
every range are hashed as a value and all the hash values make up the page ID.
Status Flag. The status flag indicates the phase status (i.e., startup, runtime
and shutdown) of a used page. The flag is initialized as startup when the kernel
boots up. Once the kernel switches from the startup phase to the runtime phase,
or from the runtime phase to the shutdown phase, appropriate exceptions are
triggered so that the offline training processor can update the flag accordingly.
In our implementation, all code pages of the guest OS are deprived of executable
permissions. Once the OS starts to boot, it will raise numerous EPT exceptions.
In the hypervisor space, there is a handler (i.e., ept handle violation) responding
to the exception, and thus the offline training processor can mark the beginning
of the runtime phase by intercepting the first execution of the user-space code
as well as its end by intercepting the execution of the reboot system call.
5.2 Database Operations
The database operations are mainly composed of three parts, i.e., populating,
saving and loading.
Populate Database. To populate the database, the KASR offline training
processor must trace all the used pages and thus dictates that only the page
raising the exception would become executable while others are non-executable.
However, we find that this will halt the kernel. The reason is that the x86
instructions have variable lengths and an instruction may cross a page boundary,
which means that the first part of the instruction is at the end of a page, while the
rest is in the beginning of the next page. Under such situations, the instruction-
fetch will result in infinite loops (i.e., trap-and-resume loops).
To address this issue, we relax the dictation and implement a queue of 2
pages that own executable permissions. When the queue is full of two pages that
have caused the first two exceptions (i.e., the first two used pages), it will then
be updated by First-in, First-out, i.e., the newest used page will be pushed in
while the oldest used page will be popped out. Besides solving the cross-page-
boundary problem, we also accelerate the tracing performance. Besides, we can
capture all loaded modules, as all of them have no less than 2 code pages.
To the end, it is not enough to obtain all the used pages by running the offline
training stage just once. Thus, it is necessary to repeat this stage for multiple
rounds until the database size becomes stable. In our experiments, 10 rounds
are enough to get a stable database (see Section 6).
Save and Load Database. The database is generated in the hypervisor space,
and stored in the hard disk for reuse. Specifically, we have developed a tiny tool
in the privileged domain to explicitly save the database into the domain’s disk
after the offline training stage, and load the existing database into the hypervisor
space during the runtime enforcement stage.
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6 Evaluation
We have implemented a KASR prototype on our private cloud platform, which
has a Dell Precision T5500 PC with eight CPU cores (i.e., Intel Core Xeon-
E5620) running at 2.40GHz. Besides, Intel VT-x feature is enabled and supports
the page size of 4KB. Xen version 4.8.2 is the hypervisor while Hardware-assisted
Virtual Machine (HVM) is the Ubuntu Server 16.04.3 LTS, which has a KASLR-
enabled Linux kernel of version 4.4.0-87-generic with four virtual CPU cores and
4GB physical memory. KASR only adds around 1.2K SLoC in Xen.
In the rest of this section, we measure the reduction rates of the kernel attack
surface. On top of that, we characterize the reduced kernel attack surface in the
metrics of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs). The use cases we
choose are SPECint, httperf, bonnie++, LAMP (i.e., Linux, Apache, MySQL and
PHP) and NFS (i.e., Network File System). Furthermore, we test and analyze its
effectiveness in defending against 6 real-world kernel rootkits. Also, we measure
the performance overhead introduced by KASR through the selected use cases
above. The experimental results demonstrate that we can effectively reduce ker-
nel attack surface by 64%, CVEs by 40%, safeguard the kernel against 6 popular
kernel rootkits and impose negligible (less than 1%) performance overhead on
all use cases.
6.1 Kernel Attack Surface Reduction
In the runtime enforcement stage, we measure the kernel attack surface reduction
through three representative benchmark tools, namely, SPECint, httperf and
bonnie++ and two real-world use cases (i.e., LAMP and NFS).
SPECint [29] is an industry standard benchmark intended for measuring the
performance of the CPU and memory. In our experiment, the tool has 12 sub-
benchmarks in total and they are all invoked with a specified configuration file
(i.e., linux64-ia32-gcc43+.cfg).
On top of that, we measure the network I/O of HVM using httperf [23].
HVM runs an Apache Web server and Dom0 tests its I/O performance at a rate
of starting from 5 to 60 requests per second (100 connections in total).
Also, we test the disk I/O of the guest by running bonnie++ [5] with its
default parameters. For instance, bonnie++ by default creates a file in a specified
directory, size of which is twice the size of memory.
Besides, we run the LAMP-based web server inside the HVM. Firstly, we use the
standard benchmark ApacheBench to continuously access a static PHP-based
website for five minutes. And then a Web server scanner Nikto [30] starts to
run so as to test the Web server for insecure files and outdated server software
and also perform generic and server type specific checks. This is followed by
launching Skipfish [22], an active web application security reconnaissance tool.
It operates in an extensive brute-force mode to carry out comprehensive security
checks. Running these tools in the LAMP server aims to cover as many kernel
code paths as possible.
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Lastly, the other comprehensive application is NFS. HVM is configured to
export a shared directory via NFS. In order to stress the NFS service, we also use
bonnie++ to issue read and write-access to the directory.
Table 1: In every case, the kernel code pages are significantly tailored after each
step. Generally, KASR can reduce the kernel attack surface by 54% after the
permission deprivation, and 64% after the lifetime segmentation. (Orig.Kern =
Original Kernel, Aft.Per.Dep. = After Permission Deprivation, Aft.Lif.Seg. =
After Lifetime Segmentation)
Cases
Orig.Kern Aft.Per.Dep. Aft.Lif.Seg.
Page(#) Page(#) Reduction(%) Page(#) Reduction(%)
SPECint 2227 1034 54% 808 64%
httperf 2236 1026 54% 763 66%
bonnie++ 2235 1034 54% 761 66%
LAMP 2238 1043 53% 817 63%
NFS 2395 1096 54% 939 61%
All results are displayed in Table 1. Note that the average results for SPECint
are computed based on 12 sub-benchmark tools. We determine two interesting
properties of the kernel attack surface from this table. First, the attack surface
reduction after each step is quite significant and stable for different use cases.
Generally, the attack surface is reduced by roughly 54% and 64% after the per-
mission deprivation and lifetime segmentation, respectively, indicating that less
than half of the kernel code is enough to serve all provided use cases. Second,
complicated applications (i.e., LAMP and NFS) occupy more kernel code pages
than the benchmarks, indicating that they have invoked more kernel functions.
CVE Reduction Although some kernel functions (e.g., architecture-specific
code) contain past CVE vulnerabilities, they are never loaded into memory dur-
ing the kernel’s lifetime run and do not contribute to the attack surface. As a
result, we only consider the CVE-vulnerable functions that are loaded into the
kernel memory. We investigate CVE bugs of recent two years that provide a link
to the GIT repository commit and identify 14 CVEs that exist in the kernel
memory of all five use cases.
We observe that KASR has removed 40% of CVEs in the memory. To be spe-
cific, some CVE-vulnerable kernel functions within the unused kernel code pages
are deprived of executable permissions after the permission deprivation. For
example, the ecryptfs privileged open function in CVE-2016-1583 before Linux
kernel-4.6.3 is unused, thus being eliminated. After the lifetime segmentation,
some other vulnerable functions are also removed (e.g., icmp6 send in CVE-
2016-9919).
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6.2 Rootkit Prevention
Even though the kernel attack surface is largely reduced by KASR, still there
may exist vulnerabilities in the kernel, which could be exploited by rootkits. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of KASR in defending against real-world kernel
rootkits. Specifically, we have selected 6 popular real-world kernel rootkits com-
ing from a previous work [25] and the Internet. These rootkits work on typical
Linux kernel versions ranging from 3.x to 4.x, representing the state-of-the-art
kernel rootkit techniques. All these rootkits launch attacks by inserting a load-
able module and they can be divided into three steps:
1. inject malicious code into kernel allocated memory;
2. hook the code on target kernel functions (e.g., original syscalls);
3. transfer kernel execution flow to the code.
KASR is able to prevent the third step from being executed. Specifically, rootkits
could succeed at Step-1 and Step-2, since they can utilize exposed vulnerabilities
to modify critical kernel data structures, inject their code and perform target-
function hooking so as to redirect the execution flow. However, they cannot
execute the code in Step-3, because KASR decides whether a kernel page has an
executable permission. Recall that KASR reliably dictates that unused kernel
code (i.e., no record in the database) has no right to execute in the kernel space,
including the run-time code injected by rootkits. Therefore, when the injected
code starts to run in Step-3, EPT violations definitely will occur and then be
caught by KASR. The experimental results from Table 2 clearly show that KASR
has effectively defended against all 6 rootkits. As a result, KASR is able to defend
against the kernel rootkits to a great extent.
Table 2: KASR successfully defended against all 6 kernel rootkits. (LKM =
Loadable Kernel Module)
OS Kernel Rootkit Attack Vector Attack Failed?
Linux 3.x-4.x
adore-ng LKM
√
xingyiquan LKM
√
rkduck LKM
√
Diamorphine LKM
√
suterusu LKM
√
nurupo LKM
√
6.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance impacts of KASR on CPU computa-
tion, network I/O and disk I/O using the same settings as we measure the kernel
attack surface reduction. Benchmark tools are conducted with two groups, i.e.,
one is called Original (HVM with an unmodified Xen), the other is KASR.
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Fig. 4: In the case of LAMP, its database
is built from scratch and keeps its size
increasing until the round 6th.
Fig. 5: Incremental offline training.
Compared to that of Figure 4, only 2
more offline training rounds based on a
provided database are needed to reach
the same stable state, largely reducing
the offline training cost.
Specifically, SPECint has 12 sub-programs and the CPU overhead caused by
KASR within each sub-program is quite small and stable. In particular, the max-
imum performance overhead is 1.47% while the average performance overhead
is 0.23% for the overall system.
Httperf tests the Apache Web server inside the HVM using different request
rates. Compared to the Original, the network I/O overhead introduced by KASR
ranges from 0.00% to 1.94% and the average is only 0.90%.
The disk I/O results are generated by bonnie++ based on two test settings,
i.e., sequential input and sequential output. For each setting, the read, write and
rewrite operations are performed and their results indicate that KASR only
incurs a loss of 0.49% on average.
6.4 Offline Training Efficiency
We take LAMP server as an example to illustrate the offline training efficiency,
indicating how fast to construct a stable database for a given workload. Specifi-
cally, we repeat the offline training stage for several rounds to build the LAMP
database from scratch. After the first round, we get 1038 code pages, 99% of the
final page number. After that, 9 successive offline training rounds are completed
one by one, each of which updates the database based on previous one, ensuring
that the final database records all used pages. From Figure 4, it can be seen
that the database as a whole becomes steady after multiple rounds (i.e., 6 in our
experiments). This observation is also confirmed in other cases.
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In fact, it is still time-consuming to build a particular database from scratch.
To further accelerate this process, we attempt to do the offline training stage
from an existing database. In our experiments, we integrate every database gen-
erated respectively for SPECint, httperf, bonnie++ into a larger one, and try to
generate the LAMP database using incremental training. Based on the integrated
database, we find that only 2 rounds are enough to generate the stable database
for LAMP, shown in Figure 5, significantly improving the offline training efficiency.
7 Discussion
In this section, we will discuss limitations of our approach.
Training Completeness. Similar to Ktrim [17], KRAZOR [16] and Face-
Change [10], KASR also uses a training-based approach. As the approach might
miss some corner cases, it may cause KASR to mark certain pages that should be
used as unused, resulting in an incomplete offline training database. Theoretically
speaking, it is possible for such situations to occur. However, in practice, they
have never been observed in our experiments so far. Interestingly, Kurmus al
et. [18] found that a small offline training set is usually enough to cover all
used kernel code for a given use case, implying that the corner cases usually do
not increase the kernel code coverage. If the generated database is incomplete,
EPT violations may have been triggered at runtime. For such situations, KASR
has two possible responses. One is to directly stop the execution of the guest,
which is suitable for the security sensitive environment where any violations
may be treated as potential attacks. The other one is to generate a log message,
which is friendly to the applications that have high availability requirements.
The generated log contains the execution context and the corresponding memory
content to facilitate a further analysis, e.g., system forensics.
Fine-grained Segmentation. By default, we have three segmented phases
(i.e., startup, runtime, and shutdown). Actually, the whole lifecycle could be
segmented into more phases, corresponding to different working stages of a user
application. Intuitively, a more fine-grained segmentation will achieve a better
kernel attack surface reduction. Nonetheless, more phases will introduce more
performance overhead, such as the additional phase switches. In addition, it will
increase the complexity of the KASR offline training processor, and consequently
increases the trusted computing base (TCB). At last, the KASR module has
to deal with the potential security attacks, e.g., malicious phase switches. To
prevent such attacks, a state machine graph of phases should be provided, where
the predecessor, successor and the switch condition of each phase should be
clearly defined. At runtime, the KASR module will load this graph and enforce
the integrity: only the phase switches existing in the graph are legal, and any
other switches will be rejected.
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8 Related Work
In this section, we provide an overview of existing approaches to enhance the
kernel security that require no changes to the kernel. Specifically, the approaches
are either kernel or hypervisor-dependent.
Kernel customizations [33,18] present automatic approaches of trimming ker-
nel configurations adapted to specific use cases so that the tailored configurations
can be applied to re-compile the kernel source code, thus minimizing the kernel
attack surface. Similarly, Seccomp [26] relies on the kernel source code to sand-
box specified user processes by simply restricting them to a minimal set of system
calls. Lock-in-Pop [19] modifies and re-compiles glibc to restrict an application’
access to certain kernel code. In contrast, both Ktrim [17] and KRAZOR [16]
utilize kprobes to trim off unused kernel functions and prevent them from being
executed. All of the approaches above aim at providing a minimized kernel view
to a target application.
In the virtualized environment, both Secvisor [27] and NICKLE [25] only
protect original kernel TCB and do nothing to reduce it. Taking a step further,
unikernel [20] provides a minimal kernel API surface to specified applications
but developing the applications is highly dependent on the underlying unikernel.
Face-Change [10] profiles the kernel code for every target application and uses
the Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) technique to detect process context
switch and thus provide a minimized kernel TCB for each application. However,
Face-Change has three disadvantages: (1) Its worst-case runtime overhead for
httperf testing Apache web server is 40%, whereas our worst overhead is 1.94%
(see Section 6.3), making it impractical in the cloud environment. (2) Its design
naturally does not support KASLR, which is an important kernel security fea-
ture and has been merged into the Linux kernel mainline since kernel version
3.14. In contrast, KASR is friendly to the security feature. (3) While multiple-
vCPU support is critical to system performance in the cloud environment, it
only supports a single vCPU within a guest VM, whereas KASR allocates four
vCPUs to the VM.
9 Conclusion
Commodity OS kernels provide a large number of features to satisfy various de-
mands from different users, exposing a huge surface to remote and local attack-
ers. In this paper, we have presented a reliable and practical approach, named
KASR, which has transparently reduced attack surfaces of commodity OS kernels
at runtime without relying on their kernel source code. KASR deploys two sur-
face reduction approaches. One is spatial, i.e., the permission deprivation marks
never-used code pages as non-executable while the other is temporal, i.e., the
lifetime segmentation selectively activates appropriate used code pages. We im-
plemented KASR on the Xen hypervisor and evaluated it using the Ubuntu OS
with an unmodified Linux kernel. The experimental results showed that KASR
has efficiently reduced 64% of kernel attack surface, 40% of CVEs in all given
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use cases. In addition, KASR defeated all 6 real-world rootkits and incurred low
performance overhead (i.e., less than 1% on average) to the whole system.
In the near future, our primary goals are to apply KASR to the kernel attack
surface reduction of a Windows OS since KASR should be generic to protect all
kinds of commodity OS kernels.
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